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I. INTRODUCTION
Ethically and politically disputable normative rules are embedded in
and constantly affect the development of the constitutional legitimacy
of many political institutions. One of these rules is the rule prohibiting
conflicts of interest, which is considered a cornerstone of the constitutional
and administrative laws of Western legal democracies. The Israeli
Supreme Court is constantly changing the boundaries of this rule in
order to prevent the slow dissolution of certain principles that comprise
our constitutional code of values. In the words of Supreme Court Chief
Justice Professor Aharon Barak:
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Things change as people manage the public's business rather than their own. In
this framework I am not at liberty to do anything on my mind. Not only am I
prohibited from inflicting damage on those whose business I manage, I am also
instructed by the organizing society to act in confidence and trust...
furthermore, I am prohibited from being in a situation where I might be in a
conflict of interests between the interest of those for whom I act and any other
interest.1
The Court has broadened the boundaries of the rule by holding that "it
is imperative to prevent the faintest shred of doubt as to the existence of
a conflict of interests, including the appearance of a conflict of
interests."2 The rule was extended so as to prevent even a potential
conflict of interest. This Article examines the essence and characteristics
of the rule that prohibits an elected official from entertaining a conflict
of interests. The Article uses the Speaker of the Knesset-the Israeli
Parliament-as a test case for three reasons: first, in many jurisdictions
the Speaker enjoys disproportionate freedom in controlling and
managing the political order of the Parliament; second, the institution of
the Speaker receives no academic attention despite its centrality, its
impact on and control of the evolution of certain concepts such as
political freedom and the role of political parties and their members; and
third, the ease with which the Speaker's parliamentary activities in
various jurisdictions can be found to be tainted by conflicts of interest.
The analysis is legal at its core. Nonetheless, its natural environment is
laced with political elements that will be explored as well.
As a way to achieve these aims, the Article will examine the parameters
of the Speaker's duties and authority and the resulting potential for
conflicts of interest. It will compare Israeli Speakers with their European
counterparts to examine how European jurisdictions confront the
problem. The authors assume that members of parliament differ from
other political public figures, and are thus bound by a stricter standard of
ethical conduct to avoid even potential conflicts of interest. Since the
Israeli Speaker is first and foremost a member of the Knesset, she is
primarily bound by the same duties as any other member of the Knesset.
However, as with other governmental hierarchies, some political offices
(e.g., ministers and deputy-ministers) are burdened with additional duties
and must be more cautious when assuming a role while encumbered by a
1. Aharon Barak, Conflict of Interest in Office, 10 HEBREw U. L. REV. (MISHPATIM)
11(1980).
2. Id.
conflict of interest. The special rules and regulations adopted by the
Knesset, which prohibit ministers and deputy-ministers from
entertaining conflicts of interest, reflect this idea. The authors believe
that Speakers belongs to the same group of public officials to whom
special rules regarding conflicts of interest apply. In other words,
Speakers are not only Members of Parliament, but hold an elevated
position due to their special duties and powers. They must be attentive
to their ability to influence the work of the Parliament, its achievements,
and the ways in which its members fulfil the hopes entrusted in them by
the public. Yet, current and past Speakers have ignored the rule
prohibiting conflicts of interest, and a public discussion is yet to be
conducted on this topic.
In its six sections, this Article examines the role of Speakers, the
nexus between their many duties and powers, possible points of conflict
among their different duties, as well as the connection between their
official duties and personal interests. This Article takes the role of the
Speaker of the Israeli Parliament as its organizing principle. Sections
Two and Three discuss the constitutional underpinnings of conflicts of
interest and the way in which these apply to Members of the Knesset.
Section Four takes the Israeli Speaker as a test case and explores in
greater details the many flaws and conflicts inherent in the present
definition of the Speaker's role. Finally, Chapter Five comparatively
examines the interplay between the Speaker of the Parliament, the
principle of conflict of interests, and other official duties of the Speaker
in the context of European jurisdictions.
II. CONFLICT OF INTERESTS: NORMATIVE PARAMETERS
A sweeping, general test for identifying conflicts of interest is difficult
if not impossible to create. Every case should be judged on its own
merit. The common denominators and distinctions among cases are the
point of conflict. The level of damage that may result from the conflict
of interest and the extent to which it is possible to neutralize the situation
without undermining the public official's ability to function in both
positions will differ depending on the circumstances. If neutralizing the
situation proves impossible, the public official must refrain from
engaging in the activity that created the conflict of interests and possibly
undo the effect of actions already taken.
The prohibition against conflicts of interest stems from the rule
prohibiting favouritism-a corollary of natural justice. The rule prescribes a
prohibition against a public official placing himself in a situation in
which a probable concern or an actual possibility of a conflict of
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interests exists. In the Halikud case,3 the Supreme Court of Israel
established the sources for the rule and identified the fiduciary duties of
a public servant: fairness, good faith and natural justice, and due process.
In the Azriel case, President Barak further emphasized the importance of
the rule prohibiting conflicts of interest:
(T]he prohibition is not only against the discretion that is part of the Action or
the public role. The prohibition is against being in a situation where there is a
chance that a conflict of interests may occur. The purpose of the rule is to
prevent the error before it happens. This rule anticipates the future ... it intends
to prevent an honest individual from being tempted. Thus there is no need to
prove that there is in fact a conflict of interests. It is sufficient to prove that
there is a probable danger of a conflict of interests. The test used by the court is
an objective test, rather than the subjective apprehension of this party or
another.
4
To identify a conflict of interests, a map of the public official's duties
and functions is needed. First, one needs to define the function that is the
object of the inquiry, the different duties encompassed within that
function, and the position holder's other roles and duties and private
businesses. One must then compare the definition of the function with
the mapping of the duties and businesses of the position holder and
identify possible areas of friction between the two. Finally, one has to
identify areas of friction where there is an apprehension that a conflict of
interests exists. The areas of friction should be tested using an objective
test: would an outsider, a reasonable person, examining all the details in
a given set of circumstances, conclude that a conflict of interests might
occur?
5
It is critical to decide whether the evaluative criteria used to find a
conflict of interests should consist of a "reasonable apprehension" or a
"patent possibility." Proponents of the patent possibility approach argue
that this more lenient standard is necessary in order to avoid deterring
citizens from pursuing public office. Proponents of the stricter approach
believe that even a reasonable apprehension of a conflict of interests
should suffice to disqualify a public official from office, or at least
3. HCJ 531/79 The Halikud Party in the Petach Tikva Municipality v. Petach
Tikva City Council [1979] lsrSC 34(2) 566, 569 [hereinafter Halikud]. HCJ Halikud
was a turning point, since up until this point the case law referred only to the rule against
favouritism, according to which no one should adjudicate his own matters. See, e.g.,
HCJ 279/60 Ulamy Gil v. Yeari and the Tel-Aviv Municipality [1960] IsrSC 15, 643.
4. HCJ 5734/98 Tzadok Azriel v. The Sub-Committee of the Israeli Real Estate
Governing Body [1998] IsrSC 53(2) 8, 14.
5. Halikud, supra note 3, at 572.
warrant restrictions on that official's power. This reasonable apprehension
test is utilized in the Knesset, and the counter-argument that this deters
citizens from seeking office appears to carry little weight: the benefits of
membership in the Knesset far outweigh the inconvenience of adhering
to the stricter test.6 The applications of the rule prohibiting conflicts of
interests differ from one area of law to the next, existing on five different
levels: criminal, administrative, civil, disciplinary, and public. The
results depend on two questions: whether the conflict involves two
public interests held in trust by one official, and whether the conflicted
interest is public or private. Since our discussion involves predominantly
administrative issues, our discussion will focus on conflicts of competing
public interests.' Israeli remedies to public conflicts of interest are
tailored to specific situations, and each case is examined on its own
merit. When a conflict is found, officials may be removed from duty,
reassigned, their power to make decisions may be limited, and their past
decisions repealed. When a conflict of interests complaint is filed
against a member with the Knesset's Ethics Committee, 8 the Committee
has the power to warn the member, remove the member from the Knesset
assembly, and even deny the member's salary and other pecuniary
benefits and privileges.
A question remains, though, as to whether these sanctions are
applicable when the Speaker's affairs are at question. It seems that the
sanctions within the jurisdiction of the Ethics Committee are difficult to
apply to the Speaker. There are substantive differences between the
Speaker and "regular" Knesset members that are based on the nature of
their roles. The current regulatory scheme give rise to some concerns
6. See HCJ 214/79 Abdelachi v. The Mayor of Tira [1979] IsrSC 34(1) 431, 433;
see also HCJ 4225/91 Gudovich v. The State of Israel [1991] IsrSC 45(5) 781, 786. The
court adopted a substantive approach to the issue of disqualification of judges. See HCJ
48/75 Yedi v. The State of Israel [1975] IsrSC 29(2) 375, 382. However, the court held
that when the issue is a conflict of interests between public interests and a private
business, the test to apply is a reasonable apprehension test. See HCJ 3132/92 Mushlav
v. The North District Zoning Committee [1992] IsrSC 47(3) 741, 747.
7. In private law matters an action originating from a situation of conflict of
interests may substantiate an argument pertaining to bad faith. See Halikud, supra note
3, at 573. In the area of criminal law, such action may constitute an investigation of
possible bribery. See Penal Act § 290, 5737-1977, (Isr.). At the disciplinary level, such
an action may be regarded as unbecoming a civil servant. See Public Service Act
(Discipline) § 17(3), 5723-1963, (Isr.). It should be mentioned that the Knesset's Ethics
Committee is not a disciplinary tribunal and its hearings should not be mistaken for
"disciplinary hearings." However, the Committee does have the jurisdiction to set
disciplinary sanctions such as a reprimand, a warning, and even removal from the
Knesset assembly. Nonetheless, the Committee's sanctioning powers are fairly limited.
8. See Rules of Ethics for Members of the Knesset A(l), Chapter G: The Ethics
Committee, THE KNESSET, http://www.knesset.gov.il/rules/eng/ethicsl.htm (last visited
Mar. 4, 2006).
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with regard to the rule prohibiting a conflict of interests, mainly because
the current legislation does not distinguish between the Speaker and
other Knesset Members. The absence of such a distinction is even more
pronounced in light of the special rules regarding the prevention of
conflicts of interest of ministers and deputy-ministers.
III. CONFLICT OF INTERESTS INVOLVING KNESSET MEMBERS
A. Principles
"All public servants," Justice Barak has remarked, "owe a duty to
avoid a conflict of interests ... and this rule is even more justified when
applied to elected officials, whose lives are constantly exposed to the
public's scrutiny, and who are expected to be the public's role models." 9
When dealing with elected officials, one must be aware of an inherent
distinction between different role holders based on their hierarchy in
public service. This Section addresses the case of Knesset members,
ministers and deputy-ministers. The principles of the debate in this
Section will later become the basis for the discussion of the Speaker.
We attempt to prove the following thesis: the existing system for
scrutinizing the actions of political players does not cover all possible
conflicts of interest. The absence of prevention leaves the political system
exposed to corruption and ill management. Consequently, public trust in
the political system is detrimentally affected. Since the Speaker is first
and foremost a member of the Knesset, the discussion will start from the
rule prohibiting conflicts of interest applicable to Knesset members.
Then we will argue that the rules set for ministers and deputy-ministers
should also apply to the Speaker, pending, of course, relevant changes.' 0
B. Knesset Members
1. The Knesset Members' 1951 Immunity, Duties and Rights Act
The Knesset Members' Immunity Act places a number of restrictions
on the ability of members to hold public positions as well as to engage in
9. Halikud, supra note 3, at 579.
10. Note that no specific legislative source strictly forbids the Speaker from
engaging in a conflict of interests. One can assume, though, that the legislator regards the
Speaker as a Knesset Member. However, unlike ordinary Knesset Members, the Speaker
always wears at least two hats: for example, the Speaker plays the role of the State
President, Knesset Member, and member of certain Knesset Committees.
certain private activities.'' Section 13A of the Act prohibits members
from acting as a city mayor, as CEO of a private corporation, or as the
head of a public office. Section 13A(b) prohibits Knesset Members from
engaging in conduct that may dishonour the Knesset, undermine the
status and duties of another member of the Knesset, or implicate a
conflict of interests. This section also distinguishes between conflicts
that implicate two public interests and those that implicate public and
private interests. Section 13A(b) is sweepingly broad, and allows for
creative interpretation.
2. The Ethics Regulations
12
For a long while, the Israeli Knesset was reluctant to regulate the
ethical behaviour of its members. It assumed that its members were
honest and trustworthy. 13 However, the political reality suggested
otherwise, and regulations of the ethical conduct of Knesset members
were created as a precautionary measure. As part of the same trend, the
ethical conduct of ministers and deputy-ministers was regulated, as well
as that of individuals elected to official municipality positions. Quite
similarly to section 13A(3) of the Immunity Act, Section 2 of the Ethics
Regulations also discusses the Knesset's honour and the qualified
immunity of Knesset members. Section 4 prohibits members from
gaining material advantage, directly or indirectly, from acts conducted
within their official capacity. Finally, Section 5 prohibits members from
engaging in actions that may result in a conflict of interests between
their official duties and personal matters.
The language of the Regulations is narrow, but it would be a mistake
to presume that they do not apply to situations that are not explicitly
mentioned. 4 A general rule protecting the honour of the Knesset may
provide a solid basis to some very creative interpretations. Additionally,
Section 24 of the Regulations includes another inclusive rule providing
that the "Ethics Committee will rule on matters that are not specifically
mentioned in these Regulations." Similarly, Section 25 provides that
"the Ethics Committee will have exclusive jurisdiction to interpret the
11. The Rights and Duties of Members of the Knesset, THE KNESSET, http://
www.knesset.gov.illdescription/eng/engwork-chakt .htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2006); see
generally Report by the Special Commission on Additional Activities (Tunik Report)
(1987) (hereinafter The Tunik Report); see also S. Nitzan, The Conflict of Interests of
Knesset Members, 20 HEBREW U. L. REv. (MISHPATiM) 457 (1991).
12. The Ethics Regulations, 5744-1983, (Isr.). These regulations draw their power
from § 13E of the Immunity Act.
13. See generally Ytzhak Zamir, Political Ethics, 17 HEBREW U. L. REV. (MISHPATM)
250, 268-69 (1988).
14. See Nitzan, supra note 11, at 475-88.
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Regulations." Thus, Sections 24 and 25 both provide a very broad basis
for interpreting the Regulations and permit the Committee to impose its
views when the text of the Regulations is unable to provide a satisfactory
answer to an ethical question. 5
Section 13D of the Immunity Act explains the possible sanctions the
Committee may utilize. These include: warnings, citations, reprimands,
severe citations, and public censure. 16 The Speaker is also technically
bound by the Ethics Regulations. However, because the Speaker
appoints the four members of the Ethics Committee and its Chair,' 7 the
Regulations have little impact on the Speaker's conduct.
C. Ministers and Deputy-Ministers
The restrictions placed on ministers and deputy-ministers are far
stricter than those placed on Knesset Members, expressing a widespread
apprehension that Ministers have greater difficulty avoiding conflicts of
interest. Section 3 of the Regulations prohibits favouritism. Sections 4-6
prohibit conflicts of interest. Section 11 gives the state comptroller the
jurisdiction to enforce these rules. However, Chapter D of the Regulations
provides an interesting escape clause,' 8 by creating a mechanism through
which ministers and deputy-ministers may appeal to a special committee
and request special authorization to abstain from following a particular
rule of the Regulations.'
9
15. The Immunity Act's 5th amendment (passed as part of the implementation of
the Tunik Commission Report, and no longer applies) provides for more restrictions on
additional activities, but also allows Knesset Members to appeal to a special Committee
for special authorization to take part in these activities. Section 23 of the Knesset
Regulations now provides a similar possible path of action for a Member seeking
approval of a questionable ethical conduct. Knesset Regulation § 23.
16. Immunity Act, supra note 15, § 13D.
17. Ethics Regulations, supra note 12, § 18.
18. Nitzan, supra note 11.
19. A natural state of a conflict of interests is also referred to as an inherent
conflict of interests. This type of a conflict of interests is considered exceptional and
subject to special rules. In these cases a role holder's conflict of interests is not
prohibited but rather inherent to the role and thus acceptable. For example, HCJ 508/83
Maof Air Lines v. The Minister of Transportation [1983] IsrSC 38(3), 533, concerned a
challenge to the policy of the Minister of Transportation regarding charter flights. The
Minister favored El-Al, the national airline, over other private airlines. The court held
that in a situation where the Minister of transportation is required to make policy
decisions that regard the national airline (which is inherently under his supervision), a
conflict of interests is unavoidable. The Court instructed the Minister to exercise caution
when making these decisions but not necessarily to avoid them.
IV. THE SPEAKER: DRAWING THE BOUNDARIES OF AUTHORITY
A. Conduct Unbecoming of Status
Although the election of the Speaker is ultimately a political process,
Speakers and their deputies must conform to due process and avoid
favouritism and conflicts of interest. Section 2 of the Knesset Regulations
emphasizes these restrictions by prohibiting ministers from serving as
the Knesset Speaker. Based on the assumption that Speakers do not
favour their party over the others, Section 3 of the Regulations provides
that Speakers and their deputies may remain in office for the duration of
the Knesset's four year term regardless of any changes in the party to
which they belong. Nonetheless, the legislation also provides for
mechanisms to suspend or remove Speakers and their deputies.2 0 This
legislation distinguishes between suspension, or removal resulting from
criminal acts, and that which results from other infractions. l
B. Authority
The authority of Speakers is derived from legislation, the Knesset
Regulations, and by their role when standing in for the state's president.
In addition, when Speakers are candidates in the elections for leadership
of their party, they are required to adhere to additional duties. Inevitably,
this wide array of duties regularly places the Speaker in a position of
conflicting interests.
1. Legislation
It would be useful to review a few examples of the many duties vested
in the Speaker. Israel's Basic Law provides that: (1) Speakers, after
consulting with their deputies, may move the assembly to another
location;22 and (2) resigning Knesset Members will submit their resignation
to the Speaker. 3 The Immunity Act provides that: (1) the Speaker is
responsible for the enforcement of the Act;24 (2) the Speaker has to give
a Member of the Knesset authorization to testify in court hearings;
2 5
(3) the Speaker can decide whether to lift a Member's legislative
immunity. 6 Additionally, the Speaker governs the implementation of
20. Basic Law: Knesset § 20(c)-(d), 5754-1994 (Isr.).
21. Knesset Act § 7, 1994, S.H. 140; Knesset Regulations, supra note 15, §§ 3A-B.
22. Basic Law: Knesset, supra note 20, § 26.
23. Id. § 40.
24. Immunity Act, supra note 15, § 16.
25, Id. § 8.
26. Id. § 13(g).
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the Knesset Member Salary Act, 5709-1949.27 The Speaker also
has managerial duties under the Knesset Building and Yard Act,
5728-1968,28 and serves as the executor of the Act. The Speaker holds
further authority according to the Civil Service (Appointments) Act,
5719-1959, the Knesset Elections Act, 5729-1969, and the Party
Sponsorship Act, 5733-1973.3o Finally, under Section 19 of the Basic
Law dealing with the President of the State, resigning presidents must
submit their letter of resignation to the Speaker.3 1
2. Knesset Regulations
The scope of the Speaker's power under the Knesset Regulations is
very broad. The Regulations impose on the Speaker more operational
duties than does other legislation. The Speaker is charged with managing
the Knesset's agenda and presenting it to the public, arranging the order
of its hearings, and the execution of its Regulations, and protecting its
honour.
3. Standing for the President
The Speaker's role is integral to the orderly transfer of executive
power in a time of emergency. Section 23 of Basic Law provides that, if
the state president is no longer acting in an official capacity either
permanently or temporarily, the Speaker serves as the acting president
until the president can reclaim his or her duties or a new president fills
the position. While replacing a president, the Speaker carries all the
duties and authority of the president's office.
C. On Duties and Authority
The point at which the authority of Speakers meets their official role
and political aspirations creates a potential for conflicts of interest. The
primary reason for this is that the Israeli Knesset is a small house of
representatives, and on a partitocratic level is an excellent example of a
divided parliament where the true political power of many parties
27. Knesset Member Salary Act § 9, 1949.
28. Knesset Building and Yard Act § 2, 1968.
29. See, e.g., Knesset Elections Act § 16, 1969.
30. See, e.g., Party Sponsorship Act § 1, 1973.
31. Basic Law: President of the State, 1964.
exceeds their relative legislative representation. In this context, the
Speaker's many roles may lead to overlapping authority, which may in
time create situations where Speakers and their deputies face conflicts of
interests.
1. Membership in the Interpretation Committee
The Knesset Regulations allow the Speaker to serve as a member of
the Interpretation Committee. This is the only Committee in which
the Speaker can act as a full member and is not restricted to simply
participating in hearings and deliberations. According to the Regulations,
interpretation of the Regulations during an assembly is within the
authority of the Speaker. The Interpretation Committee's jurisdiction is
limited to resolving interpretational question cases involving the Knesset
Regulations which surface during the Knesset assembly. The Speaker
interprets the regulation, and Knesset Members may choose to appeal the
decision after the assembly.32 The Interpretation Committee is comprised
of eight members and the Speaker. The Committee's decision is final.
The decisions that are discussed in the Committee are thus the Speaker's,
which ironically results in "letting the fox guard the henhouse."
2. Participating in Knesset Committees
The Regulations allow the Speaker to participate in general committee
hearings, but do not explain the nature of the participation. Questions
arise concerning whether this participation should be active or passive
and whether the Speaker should be able to address the committee. The
ability to address and criticize a committee's decisions may influence
committee members and the orientation of the committee's decisions.
On one hand, the fact that the Speaker is prohibited from being a full
member of all Knesset committees save the interpretation committee
indicates that the Speaker's participation is intended to be passive.
According to this approach, Speakers may not participate in committee
hearings and must stay objective in their relationship with all Knesset
members. On the other hand, prohibiting Speakers-democratically
elected Knesset members-from actively participating in committee
hearings denies them their constitutional right to influence policy and
legislation. As a principle, we favour allowing Speakers to participate in
committee hearings in the broadest sense. Otherwise, their role as the
Speaker prevents them from accomplishing their duties to their
constituents-to influence policy-making and the legislative process.
32. Knesset Regulations, supra note 15, § 149.
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Such a practice denies the Speaker the use of the power the public has
entrusted in him.
D. Where Political Activism, Authority and Duties Collide
1. The Argument
The Speaker is a political figure. Naturally, politicians want to move
up in their party's political hierarchy. The intersection of Speakers'
political aspirations with their authorities and duties place them in almost
inevitable conflicts of interest. The Speakers' political aspirations are a
direct product of their election to the Knesset. When Speakers supports
a specific candidate to act as chair of their party or are running for that
position, the Speakers' conflicting interests become even more difficult to
manage. For example, it is not uncommon for the president to travel
abroad for an official visit and to have the Speaker stand in, while still
acting as Speaker of a very active Knesset just a few months before
elections. The Speaker in this scenario is working zealously towards the
election of a candidate and attending the Interpretation Committee
hearings, which are influenced by the high volume of activity in the
Knesset.
What happens when, to add to all this, the Speaker runs for the prime
minister position-a candidacy that requires constant interaction with
party activists? In these situations the potential for wrongdoing becomes
clear, particularly as the Speaker's Interpretation Committee often must
decide whether to approve bills submitted at the last minute, which party
activists want to see enacted so as to add support to their election
campaigns.33 Furthermore, when justified by the circumstances, the
Speaker may authorize a continuance for members of the Knesset who
are required to submit an affidavit listing their property. Will Speakers
who need the support of a certain Knesset member for their candidacy
abstain from prolonging the submission period of that member's
affidavit? Under the present system, Speakers are at liberty to act as
they please to ensure their political future.
33. Knesset Regulations, supra note 15, § 134(b).
2. The Harm to Public Confidence
An obvious result of conflicts of interest is harm to public confidence
in the Knesset. The Supreme Court addressed this issue in a number of
cases. In the Eisenberg4 Case the court held:
Public confidence in government organs is one of the most precious assets of
the executive authority and the State. When the public loses its confidence in
the organs of Government, it loses its belief in the social contract forming the
basis of communal life. Significant importance should be given to considerations
that are designed to maintain, preserve and promote a feeling among the public
that its servants are not its masters and that they do their work for the public,
honestly and without corruption. 
35
Do all elected officials have an equal duty to protect the public's
confidence? Israel's Supreme Court has made a primary distinction between
civil servants and elected officials:36 "An elected official is elected by
the people and is subject to their scrutiny; a civil servant is appointed by
elected officials and subjected to the people's scrutiny.13 7 Thus, an elected
official must follow "a stricter standard of conduct., 38 The question is:
Should a distinction exist among elected officials? Let us explain: a
Knesset member is an elected position, while the Speaker is not. The
Speaker is elected by the Knesset. Arguably then, an already elected
official, re-elected by the Knesset for an additional specific role, owes a
stricter duty of trust to the public than an ordinary Knesset member.
E. Interim Conclusions
We saw that the Speaker wears many hats simultaneously and is
accordingly vested with great powers. We additionally saw that, within
all these different duties lies a serious concern about the potential for
conflicts of interest. One cannot avoid asking, how many hats can the
Speaker wear at one time? And if she can wear all these hats, how can
we ensure she does so in a way that does not violate constitutional norms
and legal rules? These problems demand review and scrutiny. It is the
authors' argument that this scrutiny should not only take the form of
judicial review. Rather, the system must internalize and re-evaluate the
problematic elements inherent in the Speaker's roles and their manifestation
in the everyday reality of the parliament.
34. HCJ 6163/92, Eisenberg v. Minister of Construction and Housing [1992] IsrSC
47(2) 229.
35. Id. at 265.
36. HCJ 4267/93 AMITAI v. The Prime Minister [1993] IsrSC 47(5) 441, 470.
37. Id. at 476.
38. Id.
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V. A COMPARATIVE EURO-BAROMETER
A. Background
The Speaker is a common institution in parliamentary traditions.39
This Section will introduce, on a comparative level, the characteristics of
the role of the Speaker in selected European parliaments, and the ways
in which states prevent speakers from engaging in conflicts of interest.
The Section is divided into four parts: the first part will discuss the
importance of a comparative constitutional legal analysis, the second
part will address election and voting procedures, the third part will
discuss authority, and finally, the fourth part will address restrictions.
Constitutions often regulate the role of the Speaker in the parliamentary
order. In most cases, the issue of procedural and substantive authority is
scattered among the constitution, regulations, and Sections. The differences
in the manner Speakers are elected and voted for are by-products of the
political structure and the parliamentary history of a given state. (For
example, consider the differences between federal and confederate
regimes). Jurisdictional differences dictate that the issue of conflicts of
interest have different impacts in different states. For example, both the
Finnish and Belgian Constitutions specifically prohibit officials from
engaging in a conflict of interests while in office.40 Similarly, in other
states this prohibition may be inferred from constitutional provisions, or
is referenced to it in specific legislation. In all the states we examine,
the rules prohibiting parliament members from engaging in conflicts of
interest apply to the Speaker as a member of the parliament. That being
said, one should not conclude that the issue of the Speaker's conflicts of
interest should not be regulated separately-an approach we strongly
advocate and support. Such regulation is even more crucial when the
Parliamentary make-up is problematic and extremely fragmented, such
as in the cases of the Israeli Knesset and the Belgian parliament.
Our starting point for this Section is identical to the main argument of
the Article: no specific reference to the Speaker exists in special
39. While generally in this Article we refer to the "Speaker", in this Chapter we
shall mention in brackets the name of the office that is equivalent to the Knesset Speaker
in the specific jurisdictions we shall discuss. For example: Speaker, Chairman, Chairperson,
and President of Parliament.
40. Const. § 32 (Fin.), available at http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/fi00000_.
html (last visited Apr. 14, 2006); Const. art. 143 (Belg.), available at http://www.
oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/beOOOOO_.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2006).
legislation or regulations, despite the fact that the Speaker oversees a
number of areas in which interests overlap, and is therefore constantly
confronted with conflicts of interests.
B. A Note on Comparative Constitutional Analysis
The choice of a comparative methodology is an important one.
Scholars grapple with the importance of comparative law in general, and
of comparative constitutional law specifically. There are at least four
main reasons why comparative constitutional research is vital. First,
such research allows one to look for possible solutions to constitutional
problems. Second, a comparative analysis motivated by general curiosity,
rather than as a method of solving a specific problem, enables researchers to
articulate and expand their understanding not only of foreign countries,
but also of their own constitution. Such analysis provides researchers
with a more detached perspective, as they would not invest the same
kind of personal emotional energy into the problems they research in the
foreign jurisdiction. Third, one should not forget that the two approaches-a
problem solving and *an objective approach-are complementary. On
the one hand, one needs prior knowledge of other Constitutional orders
to conduct a comparative problem analysis. On the other hand, exploring
the meaning of a specific problem in another jurisdiction in order to
draw conclusions applicable to the researcher's home jurisdiction
deepens the pool of knowledge of the foreign jurisdiction.4'
Finally, the differences among the jurisdictions help us to reassess our
own constitutional order from a more general perspective, rather than a
specific, problem oriented glance. In this Article our objective is of the
first and last kinds: our gaze is both introspective and outward looking.
While we wish to examine solutions to the potential conflict of interest
situations in which the Israeli Speaker may find himself, we also wish to
gain perspective on this problem by examining the dilemmas other
jurisdictions are faced with in this context.
C. Election and Voting Procedures
1. Election Procedures
The Israeli custom is to elect a new Speaker at the first Knesset
assembly. Section 3(3) of the Knesset Regulations provides that Speakers
41. See Vicki C. Jackson & Mark Tushnet, Introduction to DEFINING THE FIELD OF
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, xii-xiii (Vicki C. Jackson & Mark Tushnet eds.,
2002); Kazuyuki Takahashi, Why Do We Study Constitutional Laws of Foreign Countries,
and How?, id. at 35, 47-48; Donald P. Kommers, Comparative Constitutional Law: Its
Increasing Relevance, id. at 61-63.
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and their deputies are elected for the duration of the Knesset seat (four
years or less). This is not an international parliamentary rule. Some
regimes elect the Speaker every time the parliament returns from
recess. For example, the Finnish Speaker is elected for each parliamentary
session.4 2 In Belgium, the Speaker of the lower house is elected on the
second Tuesday of every October, and in Denmark on the third day of
the first week of October. An annual re-election of the Speaker is a very
effective method for preventing conflicts of interest. A short residency
does not leave room, at least theoretically, for misconduct. Common
only among parliaments, up until the election of a new Speaker, the
most senior member of the Parliament manages the assembly.
43
A Speaker is not always elected by the Parliament itself. In Austria,
the Bundestrat Presidency presides in six month rotations starting on
January 1 and ending July 1. The Presidency rotates to the leader of the
predominant party of each province (Ldnder), who in turn is elected to
federal parliament by each province's parliament." Although the federal
parliament does not directly elect the Speaker, the rotation provides for a
sense of equality among the different provinces that are represented in
the Bundestrat. The most notable advantage of this method is that, in
effect, the people elect the Speaker, as the Bundestrat Presidency is held
by the leader of the most popular party of each province.
2. Voting Procedures
According to Section 1 of the Knesset Regulations, the Knesset elects
the Speaker and deputies in open elections. However, most parliaments
do not follow this rule.45 Although the language of Section 15(9)(1) of
the Irish Constitution is similar to that of Israeli legislation- "Each
House of the Oireachats [The Irish Parliament] shall elect from its
Members its own Chairman. "-the voting is not open.4 6 The Finnish
and Estonian Constitutions likewise allow their parliaments to pick the
42. Const. § 34 (Fin.), supra note 40.
43. For example, the parliaments of Israel and Portugal.
44. See Bernard Charpin, Report on the Methods of Election of the Speaker or
President of Parliaments, Constitutional and Parliamentary Information, 1 st Series No.
157, at 163, 166 (1989).
45. Id.
46. Const. art. 15(9) (Ir.), available at http://www.taoiseach.gov.ie/upload/publications/
297.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2006).
Speaker, but their vote is secret.47 This begs the question: if the Israeli
Speaker is obligated to sustain equality among Knesset members-to be a
neutral figure despite any political affiliation-why not hold secret
elections in Israel? Why should the Speaker have the opportunity to
examine the voting behaviour of Knesset members during election?
3. Authority
A comparison of the authority and duties of the Speakers in the
examined parliaments reveals many similarities. Constitutions rarely
define the role of Speakers and their place in the constitutional
hierarchy. It is usually the parliament regulations and other regulations
that set the specific boundaries of the Speaker's authority regarding
procedure and discipline.48  The Constitution of Finland is a notable
exception. In addition to mentioning the rule prohibiting conflict of
interests, the Finnish Constitution specifies all the powers and duties of
the Speaker. Section 34 of the Constitution provides:
The Speaker, the Deputy Speakers and the Chairpersons of Parliamentary
Committees form the Speaker's Council. The Speaker's Council issues
instructions on the organisation of parliamentary work and decides, as
specifically provided in this Constitution or in the Parliament's Rules of
Procedure, on the procedures to be followed in the consideration of matters in
the Parliament. The Speaker's Council may put forward initiatives for the
enactment or amendment of Acts governing parliamentary officials or the
Parliament's Rules of Procedure, as well as proposals for other provisions
governing the work of the Parliament.
49
Section 42 provides:
The Speaker convenes the plenary sessions, presents the matters on the agenda,
oversees the debate and ensures that the Constitution is complied with in the
consideration of matters in plenary session.
The Speaker shall not refuse to include a matter on the agenda or a motion in a
vote, unless he or she considers it to be contrary to the Constitution, another Act
or a prior decision of the Parliament. In this event, the Speaker shall explain the
reasons for the refusal. If the Parliament does not accept the decision of the
Speaker, the matter is referred to the Constitutional Law Committee, which
shall without delay rule whether the action of the Speaker has been correct.
The Speaker does not participate in debates or vote in plenary sessions.
50
European and Israeli Speakers often possess similar powers, although
exceptions are not uncommon. Unlike the Israeli Speaker, who is
47. "The election of the Speaker and the Deputy Speakers is conducted by secret
ballot," Const. § 34 (Fin.), supra note 40.
48. See generally Powers of the Speaker/President in the Chamber, Association of
Secretaries General of Parliaments (ASGP), 1st Series No. 162, 1991, 28-43.
49. Const. § 34 (Fin.), supra note 40.
50. Id. § 42.
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restricted from actively participating in any parliamentary committee
(other than the Interpretation Committee),' the Speaker of the Irish
lower house is a member of the Ethics Committee as a result of the 1995
Ethics in Public Office Act. 52 The Irish Speaker also holds inspection
powers during general elections.53 She also enjoys substantial powers in
organizing the daily agenda of the parliament.
One of the main duties of the Speaker is to oversee the appropriateness of
debating bills. Section 134(c) of the Knesset Regulations provides that a
bill will be brought before the Knesset if the Speaker or deputies do not
find it to be "of racist content or of content negating the existence of the
state of Israel as the State of the Jewish people." Similar words are
found in other regimes. Section 89 of the Italian Parliament Regulations
authorizes the Speaker (President) to not bring to vote bills that are
contrary to the spirit of the Constitution.5 Granted, it seems that the
powers vested in Speakers are broad and may expose them to many
conflicts. Finland is a good example of a parliamentary system that
limits the powers of the Speaker with respect to the presentation of bills.
Section 42 of the Finnish Constitution limits the Speaker's powers and
permits the parliament to disagree with the Speaker and to request that
the bill be sent to the Constitution, Legislation and Justice Committee
56
The absence of a similar system of checks and balances in Israel and in
other jurisdictions puts the Speaker in further jeopardy of facing a
conflict of interests.
D. Restrictions on Election to Other Public Offices
and on Private Businesses
1. Elections
Many parliamentary regimes customarily allow all members of the
Parliament to act as Speaker. In Israel, Finland, and Estonia, the
situation is different. Section 2 of the Knesset Regulations provides that
"a Member of the Government will not be the Speaker. . . ." Similarly,
51. Knesset Regulations, supra note 15, §§ 7-8.
52. Ethics in Public Office Act, 1995 (Ir.), available at http://www.irishstatute
book.ie/ZZA22Y 1995.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2006).
53. The Electoral (Amendment) Act, 1998 (Act No. 25/1997) (Ir.), available at
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/1998_4 (last visited Mar. 4, 2006).
54. Knesset Regulations, supra note 15, § 134(c).
55. Italian Parliament Regulations § 89.
56. See, e.g., Const. § 42 (Fin.), supra note 40.
Section 64 of the Finnish Constitution says: "If a Minister is elected
President of the Republic or the Speaker of Parliament, he or she shall be
considered to have resigned the office of Minister as from the day of
election.,
57
Specific legislation addressing the election of Speakers is rare.
Elections for Speaker are typically governed by parliamentary custom.
In Denmark, the sole candidate typically comes from the largest party,58
and that the candidate is obligated to accept the candidacy.59 The
parliamentary regulation of Denmark prohibits the Speaker from actively
participating in hearings. However, when the Speaker asks to participate
in hearings, one of the deputies takes over and chairs the assembly.
60
This arrangement was created in order to avoid a situation where the
Speaker "wears more than one hat" at once. Obviously, the idea of the
Speakers acting as both parliament members and Speakers at the same
time is problematic. However, this arrangement has the benefit of
allowing Speakers to practice their elementary right as members of
parliament to participate in hearings.
One possible solution to the above paradox is to accept the Danish or
Belgian models that elect the Speaker annually on the beginning of the
fall term. An annual election may prove effective as a means to prevent
conflicts of interest. However it may not be the right solution for every
scenario. We must consider that in a politically divided parliament, in
which small parties enjoy power that is disproportionate with their size,
one must be attentive to the potential for political clash that surrounds
the election of the Speaker.
In addition, unlike Denmark or Germany, the Finnish Speaker typically
does not belong to the same party as the prime minister belongs. This
custom assumes that when the prime minister and Speaker belong to the
same party there may be more opportunities for a conflict of interests,
and it is designed to balance these interests. Consider, for example
circumstances where the Speaker and prime minister belong to the same
party and a confidence vote is at stake: the Speaker has the power to
suspend the confidence hearing.
57. Id. § 64.
58. The Parliament Regulations of Denmark prescribe that the Speaker will be
elected from the largest party and her four deputies will be elected proportionally from
the next largest parties. Standing Orders of the Folketing § 3(1) (1953).
59. It is virtually impossible to impeach the German Speaker (President) except for
extreme circumstances. Conversely, in Denmark it takes a majority of 60 Parliament
Members to pass a vote of no confidence. Id. § 2(2).
60. Id. § 4(3).
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2. Additional Vocations
The Israeli Immunity of Knesset Members' Act does not prohibit its
members from engaging in additional vocations, although many argue
that such a prohibition is necessary. 62 In other systems, such restriction
exists as a constitutional principle.62 However, similar to Israel, the
absence of sweeping restrictions in most European jurisdictions allows
conflicts of interest to flourish.
Statistics collected by the Belgian Senate show that typical Belgian
parliament members spend more than 50% of their time in their electoral
region.63 According to statistics gathered in 2000, extra-parliamentary
occupations are profitable, and occupy 70% of the time of both houses
of the Belgian federal parliament. Many parliament members have also
served as mayors or members of other regional institutions.64 Finally,
Belgian members of parliament are often active party members and
serve as chairs of regional district branches or as members of party
committees.6 5 While Israeli law allows Knesset members to engage in
party activity, it does not allow them to receive monetary compensation
for such activity.6 6
The Belgian federal parliament has attempted to limit what has
become a custom: cumul des mandats-assuming official duty in
multiple roles simultaneously. In 1999 the Belgian parliament adopted a
1985 French law 67 which allows Parliament Members to assume only
one additional official position from a closed list of permitted roles. 
8
61. See H. Cain & D. Ben Porat, A Comparative Survey of Constitutional
Arrangements Regarding the Executive Branch, KNESSET RESEARCH CENTRE (2003).
62. For example, section 99 of the Estonian Constitution provides: "Members of
the Government of the Republic may not hold any other public office or belong to the
leadership or council of a commercial enterprise." Const. § 99 (Est.).
63. See Lieven De Winter, Intra- and Extra-Parliamentary Role Attitudes and
Behavior of Belgian MPs, 3/1 J. LEGIS. STUD. 128-54 (1997); F. Drion, L 'absent~isme
parlementaire, Diagnostic et remkdes, RES PUBLICA 22, 79-100 (1980).
64. De Winter, supra note 63.
65. Id.
66. Immunity Act, supra note 15, § 13A.
67. See Law No. 85-104 of Dec. 30, 1985, Journal Officiel de la R6publique [J.O.]
[Official Gazette of France]. Lately the French passed two new bills prohibiting holding
parallel positions. See Law No. 2000-294 of Apr. 5, 2000, Journal Officiel de la
R6publique [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Apr. 6, 2000, at 5238; Law No. 2000-295
of Apr. 5, 2000, Journal Officiel de la R6publique [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France],
Apr. 6, 2000, at 5239.
68. See Law of May 4, 1999, Moniteur Belge [Official Gazette of Belgium], July
28, 1999, at 28229; Law of May 4, 1999, Moniteur Belge [Official Gazette of Belgium],
Through this legislation, the Belgian law prevents members of parliament
from placing too much emphasis on the interests of the provinces, thus
preventing conflicts of interest. Additionally, the Act places a cap on
members' earnings from private businesses, and aims to prevent members
of parliament from considering private interests while in office.69
The constraints imposed on Belgian parliament members are essential
to the existence of a stable democratic order; the public may interpret a
lack of restraint as a breach of trust. Prior to 1999, Belgian citizens were
rated the least likely to trust their politicians out of all member states of
the European Union.70 In explaining the reasons for Belgium's recent
restraints, De Winter identifies corruption as one of the immediate
results of allowing members of parliament to hold multiple public
positions:
Apart from their inclination towards clientelist service responsiveness towards
the individual constituents, Belgian politicians also engage massively in
collective responsiveness activities. They perceive this as an important
extraparliamentary role.
Given the strong impact of Belgian parties on executive decision-making (see
below), MPs can through contact with ministers, their cabinets, party nominated
civil servants, etc. play a very manipulative role in the executive decision-
making process. They thus satisfy demands of individual constituents as well as
of the collective constituency.
Due to this prominence of pork barrel politics in the role definition of politicians
and of voters, and the large opportunities politicians have for satisfying the
collective needs of their constituency, Belgian political elites are more
vulnerable to corruption offers.
71
A constitutional democracy that overlooks the need to prevent its
elected officials from holding multiple positions undermines stability. In
a small parliament governed by partitocracy-in which the power of the
smaller parties greatly exceeds their actual size, and in which every
member holds a number of extra parliamentary positions that require
protection of other interests-a loyal parliament member is more a
dream than a reality. The Belgian example is very similar to the Israeli
one. Much like the case of the Israeli Speaker, the Belgian legislature
has not adopted special rules for its Speaker, despite the fact that the
July 28, 1999, at 28232; Law of May 25, 1999, Moniteur Belge [Official Gazette of
Belgium], July 28, 1999, at 28239.
69. See supra note 68.
70. Only 18% of Belgians believe that the national government should be in
charge of information campaigns. European Commission, Standard Eurobarometer No.
4959 (Sept. 1998), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/publicopinion/archives/eb/
eb49/eb49 report en.pdf.
71. Lieven De Winter, Political Cbrruption in the Belgian Partitocracy: (Still) an
Endemic Disease? 9 (European University Institute, Working Paper RSC No. 2000/31,
2000) (on file with author).
[VOL. 7: 313, 2006] Public Trust and Political Legitimacy
SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J.
Speaker possesses much more power, authority, and duties than ordinary
members of parliament. It is not surprising, then, that the multitude of
roles and powers make the role of the Belgian federal Speaker attractive
to provincial institutions and the private sector.
3. The Constitutional Status of the Rule on Prohibiting
Conflict of Interests
Some constitutions have specific prohibitions against conflicts of
interest. What then is the normative hierarchy of a rule prohibiting
conflicts of interest that is not embedded in the constitution? Section 32
of Finland's constitution specifically refers to the constitutional status of
the rule prohibiting conflicts of interest.72 Similarly, Article 143 of the
Belgian constitution, with regards to De la prdvention et du reglement
des conflits d'intr&ts, provides:
(1) In the exercise of their respective responsibilities, the
Federal Government, the communities, the regions, and the
common Community Commission act in the interests of
federal loyalty, in order to prevent conflicts of interest.
(2) The senate makes decisions, by means of well-founded
judgments, on conflicts of interest which may exist between
the various bodies through laws, decrees, or rulings as
described in Article 134, within the conditions and according
to the procedures determined by a law adopted by majority
vote as described in Article 4, last paragraph.
(3) A law adopted by majority vote as described in 4, last
paragraph, organizes the procedures designed to prevent
and to settle conflicts of interest between Federal, Community,
and Regional Governments, and between the common
Community Commission assembly.
(4) Concerning the prevention and the settling of conflicts of
interest, the ordinary law of August 9th, 1980 regarding
72. Section 32 provides:
A Representative is disqualified from consideration of and decision-making in
any matter that concerns him or her personally. However, he or she may
participate in the debate on such matters in a plenary session of the Parliament.
In addition, a Representative shall be disqualified from the consideration in a
Committee of a matter pertaining to the inspection of his or her official duties.
Const. § 32 (Fin.), supra note 40.
institutional reform remains valid; it nonetheless can be
rescinded, completed, modified, or rep3laced only by those
laws described in sections (2) and (3).
The absence of a rule prohibiting conflicts of interest in a constitutional
order does not undermine its importance. For example, the Irish constitution
upholds a few "values"-such as the rules of natural justice-from
which one can infer a prohibition of conflicts of interest.74 The Israeli
Supreme Court has likewise ruled that the lack of legislation does not




Throughout this Article we have suggested that the rules prohibiting
ministers and deputy ministers from engaging in conflicts of interest
apply to the Speaker. In this Section, however, we shall explore four
alternative solutions: (i) the establishment of a Knesset presidency for
special matters; (ii) an election of a Speaker who does not come from the
ranks of Knesset Members; (iii) a broadening of the restrictions on the
conduct of the Speaker; and (iv) the creation of an ethics committee
tailored specifically to matters relating to the Speaker.
As discussed above, we suggest that Speakers and their deputies
should be restricted from participating in parliamentary committee
hearings as prescribed in Section 8 of the Knesset Regulations. We also
mentioned the constitutional problem such restrictions create: the Speakers'
inability to fulfil their parliamentary duties to the public that elected
them as Knesset members. In order to overcome the difficulties inherent
in the institution of the Speaker, we argue Knesset members should no
longer serve as speakers. Rather, an apolitical figure-perhaps a retired
justice-should serve in that role. Additionally, we argue that the Speaker
should be restricted from managing any public institutions, voluntarily
or otherwise, particularly during times of heavily partisan political
activity (i.e. before elections). We recommend the creation of a separate
73. Const. art. 143 (Belg.), supra note 40. It is definitely fair to say that the very
problematic political tension between the 3 Belgian Regions creates an atmosphere that
requires a constitutional entrenchment of the rule prohibiting conflicts of interest. The
three Regions (save only the capital, Brussels) each have two Parliaments (one for the
Community and one for the Region). The multitude of Parliaments, in and of itself,
creates conflicts of interest between positions in the Regional Parliament and the Federal
Parliament.
74. See, e.g., Const. art. 43 (Ir.); see also the Irish Supreme Court ruling in The
State (Ryan) v. Lennon [1935] 69 I.L.T.R. 125.
75. Halikud, supra note 3, at 573.
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parliamentary mechanism entrusted with supervising the Speaker's
activities. In addition, we recommend abolishing the Speaker's role as a
stand-in for the president. One option would be to appoint the most
senior Knesset member to stand in for the president when necessary.
Shifting this responsibility from the Speaker to the most experienced
Knesset member would be a vote of confidence in that member's many
years of parliamentary contribution.
B. A Special Parliament Presidency
A new Knesset presidency composed of the Speaker and deputies, the
members of the Ethics and Constitutional Committees, and the Knesset's
legal advisor could be a viable alternative to the present structure.
Presidents will have the right to consult with the attorney general and
provide their opinions on a case-by-case basis. We suggest that, as a
matter of mandatory policy, the Knesset legal advisor or the Israeli
attorney general should be consulted in specific circumstances, such as a
vote for new general elections. Additionally, we recommend expanding
the scope of the consultations Speakers must undertake with their
deputies. Doing so will render some of the concerns concerning the
Speaker's biases irrelevant.
The creation of a new Knesset presidency will reduce the scope of the
Speaker's authority and power. A more expansive consultation procedure
would likewise reduce the Speaker's power and impose on him a duty of
consultation with other officials. A consultation mechanism is not
entirely foreign to Israeli Speakers. A number of rules and regulations
require Speakers to consult with their deputies or with a parliamentary
committee.76 Additionally, we recommend that Knesset members have
the opportunity to raise specific issues for discussion in the hearings of
the presidency committee. However, it is important to stress that the
Speaker's current roles should not be neutralized beyond what is
absolutely necessary.
C. A New Special Ethics Sub-Committee
Alternatively, we recommend the establishment of a new Ethics Sub-
Committee that is solely tasked with supervising the activities of the
Speaker. Even if the Knesset will not specifically regulate the ethical
76. See, e.g., Knesset Regulations, supra note 15, §§ 18A-C, 87, 23, 27(b), 79(a).
conduct of the Speaker, as is the case with ministers, the Ethics Sub-
Committee will have jurisdiction to evaluate the ethical conduct of the
Speaker. This again shall be a balancing mechanism: this balance may
be achieved either by creating a Knesset presidency and limiting the
scope of the Speaker's powers, or by creating an Ethics Sub-Committee
for the Speaker.
One of the best features of these intra-parliamentary balance mechanisms
is that they reduce the need to petition the Supreme Court of Israel when
disputes over internal Knesset decisions arise. The Supreme Court will
be able to "stay away from forming opinions on purely political matters
that have the potential of dividing the public, and thus the Supreme
Court will have a better chance of sustaining its image as a non-political
institution."77 In short, the Supreme Court will avoid involvement in the
"political realm.",
78
D. A Politically Neutral Speaker
A somewhat far-fetched solution is electing a non-politician who is
not affiliated with any political party for the post of the Speaker. This
extreme mechanism would require drafting and amending the existing
legislation and Regulations. 79 For example, the minimum standard of
qualification for the position of Speaker would require modifications.
For the purpose of comparison, Section 19 of the Knesset Act provides:
To qualify as a legal advisor to the Knesset, a citizen and resident of Israel must
be qualified to be appointed a Supreme Court Justice, and he/she should not
have been politically active, or member of a party for five years prior to
candidacy. For the purpose of this section, a person who did not pay party
membership dues and did not participate in any other party activities will not be
regarded as a party member.
80
Perhaps the most effective option is to borrow from the custom of
statutory inquiry commissions and appoint a former Supreme Court
justice to act as Speaker. Ironically, perhaps the best way to prevent the
politicization of the judiciary will be to "judiciarize" the political
system.
77. HCJ 6490/97 Alhaj v. Abu Akal [1997] IsrSC 53(2) 49.
78. CA 6095/00 Ministry of Interior Affairs v. Slach Hibawi et al. [2000] IsrSC
55(2) 1, 10.
79. We recommend applying the same vocational and public position restrictions
on the Speaker as is the case with the President of the state or the state's Comptroller.
See State Comptroller Law [Consolidated Version] § 7, 1958 (Isr.), available at http:/
www.mevaker.gov.il/serve/site/English/emevaker.asp (last visited Mar. 4, 2006).
80. Knesset Act, supra note 21.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS
The public's trust in its parliament is a prerequisite for the stability of
every democratic order. The many roles, duties and powers of Speakers
make their main role of upholding the public's trust virtually impossible.
The fear is that the Speaker's many duties and powers may collide. In
Israel, Speakers of parliament also serves as active party members; they
are allowed to declare candidacy for the chair of that party (including the
largest party in the Knesset), and may continue serving as Speakers even
if they are candidates for such a position. Speakers may also offer their
candidacy to serve as the elected chairs of several national union
organizations.8' We are of the opinion that this combination of duties and
powers present opportunities for activities that are "not becoming" of a
public official: 82 "activities that may undermine the Knesset's dignity,
the [Speaker's] status as member of the Knesset, or his duties as
member of the Knesset, ' '83 as well as activities that may give rise to
an "apprehension of bad faith" or "personal advantage. 84
The Israeli legislature has already recognized the importance of
preventing conflicts of interest and has accordingly enacted special rules
to prevent ministers and deputy-ministers from engaging in conflicts of
interest. However, the legislation has not recognized the difference
between an ordinary Knesset member and the Speaker. This begs the
question: why is it that no similar rules exist to supervise the activities of
the Speaker? Does the reason lie within the hierarchy of Israel's
constitutional regime? The legislation's stricter treatment of ministers
than members of the Knesset indicates that the scope of power that
accompanies a specific role is an important factor in determining how
strictly a certain office should be regulated. The more powerful the role,
the more exacting the duty should be to comply with a stricter set of
ethical rules and norms. We argue that the Speakers' duties and power
exceeds that of an "ordinary" member of the Knesset tenfold. Thus, we
must ask why are the ethical rules that apply to the Speaker not stricter
than those that apply to ordinary Members of the Knesset? We
recommend applying to the Speaker rules preventing conflicts of interest
at least similar in scope to those that apply to ministers. Alternatively,
81. Immunity Act, supra note 15, § 13A(1).
82. Knesset Act, supra note 21, § 8(a).
83. Immunity Act, supra note 15, § 13A(b)(1).
84. Id. § 13A(b)(2).
we recommend adopting more far-reaching mechanisms, including the
establishment of a special Ethics Sub-Committee or appointing an apolitical
figure-perhaps a former Supreme Court justice-as the Speaker.
Montesquieu wrote in Mes pensges: 'Un chariot qui a quatre roues
peut aller avec trois, mme avec deux; mais ilfaut disposer autrement.'
A four-wheel chariot may ride with three or even two wheels; however,
it needs reorganization to be able to do that. It seems that, as in the case
of the two-wheel chariot, the Knesset should be prepared to employ
sincere efforts and a creative imagination to perform the much needed
reorganization that will facilitate the continuum of the Speaker chariot's
motion.
